

The Intuitive Process: The Case of Psychotherapy

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Intuition may be considered a common factor in psychotherapy, characterizing both psychotherapist and client functioning. After reviewing existing models for intuition, the author proposes a 5-phase model to explain intuition on the basis of the cognitive functions of pattern discovery and recognition. It is argued that intuition should not be viewed as a single phenomenon; rather, the phenomena labeled as intuition can be understood as belonging to different phases of a single process. These phases consist of early knowledge representations that demonstrate the creative role that intuition may play in the construction of knowledge. The author illustrates this model by presenting examples from the practice of psychotherapy. Finally, the author discusses the possibilities of promoting intuitive insight, the fallibility of intuition, and the role intuition may play in integrative decision making.

Experience persuades me that many people must follow the same circle from intuition through intellectual analysis to restored spontaneity (Yehudi Menuhin, 1997).

The psychotherapist who considers his methods and decisions exclusively the result of conscious reasoning is most likely mistaken. No therapist can reasonably deny following hunches, experiencing sudden insights, choosing directions without really knowing why, or having uncanny feelings that turn out to be of great importance for therapy. All these phenomena are occurrences of intuitive modes of functioning. As Laughlin (1997) put it, “Comparatively little knowledge is derived initially from

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conscious reasoning. Indeed, the very nature of our brain and its modes of producing our world of meaningful experience are inherently intuitive” (p. 32). Thus, intuition may be considered a common factor in psychotherapy (see, e.g., Frank, 1982; Weinberger, 1993), characterizing both psychotherapist and client functioning.

In spite of the fact that intuition is a universally recognized experience, it is poorly studied in psychology in general, and remarkably little has been published about its role in psychotherapy. One of the reasons is probably the strict division that has been made between intuition and reason, to the point that some authors have claimed that intuition is unscientific (e.g., Bunge, 1962; Weissman, 1987). For those authors who have written extensively about intuition (see, e.g., Bastick, 1982; Westcott, 1968), it has proven difficult to go beyond the descriptive approach of this phenomenon, in the sense of explaining the existence of intuition and proposing mechanisms for its functioning. There is no cognitive theory about intuition. In fact, there isn't even a clear consensus regarding what phenomena should be classified as intuition.

In this article, I first review the different meanings of intuition. After this, I discuss some explanatory models of intuition, arguing that intuition should be viewed as a cognitive function based on pattern recognition processes. I propose a five-phase model through which the variety of phenomena that have been labeled as intuition can be classified according to the way knowledge is represented in each phenomenon. I thus show that intuition should be viewed not as a single phenomenon but rather as a process. The phases of this intuitive process consist of early knowledge representations, which thus reveals the often-mentioned creative character of intuition. I propose that intuition is a common cognitive process and essential in the process of knowledge construction. I then apply the model to the case of psychotherapy. I discuss different intuitive phenomena in clinical practice, showing that intuition is an important tool for psychotherapy and even essential for the encounter with the patient when the specificity of his or her character structure eludes theoretical models. Finally, I discuss some ideas about how to promote intuition and the limitations and fallibility of intuition.

DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON INTUITION

Intuition first became a popular subject for scientific study at the beginning of the 20th century, when scientists were investigating several modes of scientific thought. It was a period of great discoveries in physics and mathematics, and, consequently, there was an interest in understand-

ing the psychology of scientific genius (Poincaré, 1908; Wertheimer, 1945/1997). An influential book was Hadamard's (1945) *The Psychology of Invention in the Mathematical Field*, in which he discussed the results of interviews with various scientists. Hadamard reported many examples of how intuition is an important factor for progress in the (mathematical) sciences. Though it was recognized that intuition could not be described along the classical lines of rational reasoning, intuition was considered the pinnacle of rationality, a peak beyond rationality that was only reserved for the genius.

The most common phenomenon that scientists report is the role that intuition plays as an important guiding principle for finding solutions to scientific problems. Intuition tells the scientist which directions are promising, where to search for a solution, and which avenues are dead ends. A second type of intuition Hadamard (1945) described is the sense that something is lacking. In this type, the person knows something about a solution rather than the solution itself: The scientist, for instance, knows that there is a solution before knowing its contents or senses that a solution is imminent. A third phenomenon Hadamard reported is the appearance of images, or kinesthetic feelings, that contain guidelines for the solution of problems. An example is Kékulé's dream of a snake biting its tail, which helped him to understand the circular molecular structure of benzene (see Wotiz & Rudofsky, 1954). Some of these images come up clearly and suddenly (Boucouvalas, 1997); in other cases they are the product of a fringe process of ongoing images and sensations. Einstein (from a letter cited in Hadamard, 1945) gave an example of this:

The psychical entities which seem to serve as elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be "voluntarily" reproduced and combined. . . . The above mentioned elements are, in my case, of visual and some muscular type. (pp. 142–143)

Finally, Hadamard described how he experienced illumination after an incubation stage: "A solution long searched for appeared to me at once without the slightest instant of reflection on my part" (p. 8). Many scientists have mentioned that they (sometimes intentionally) forget a problem they are working on so that, after some time, ideas for a solution pop up at unexpected moments. Poincaré (1913, cited in Hadamard, 1945) described the same experience of finding a long-sought-for solution when he entered a bus: "At the moment when I put my foot on the step, the idea came to me without anything in former thoughts seeming to have paved the way for it" (p. 13).

In the 1960s and 1970s intuition was welcomed, quite differently this time, as the *counterpart* of rational thought (Bachelard, 1968; Fischer, 1971; Westcott, 1968). Intuition became equal to listening to and relying on one's feelings rather than one's mind. It started to serve a political

function, providing an alternative to the rational–scientific modes of functioning characteristic of the establishment. Intuition tells one what is good for one, where to go with one’s life, what to eat, whom to trust, or what to avoid. A frequently reported phenomenon in this respect is the sense of warning about danger (Boucouvalas, 1997; Davis-Floyd & Davis, 1997). Recently, this type of intuition has undergone a revival in new age movements (Devereux & Thompson, 1989; Lerner-Robbins, 1993; Vaughan, 1979). This has had impact in such fields as medicine (Kenny, 1994; Miksanek, 1993) and management (Agor, 1991; Foster, 1994; Schultz, 1994), as advocates have asserted that the professional should be led by his or her gut feeling and inner compass in his or her decision making.

Traditionally, intuition has always been valued in the arts as representing inspiration or the creative source (Inglis, 1987). A friend of mine who is a photographer told me that he is looking for the perfect photograph. He already knows what he wants to express with it and has some idea of the direction, but he doesn’t know its final form.

Finally, a still different meaning for intuition can be found in experimental cognitive psychology, in which it has the meaning of a guess in experiments in which subjects, often children, are asked to give answers that are tentative or of which they are not quite sure (see, e.g., Feldman, 1998; Flavell & Green, 1999). In this case, intuition represents poorly sedimented knowledge or a hunch (see Spinney, 1998).

In summary, at least 11 different meanings for intuition can be identified:

1. an experienced scientist’s feeling of direction, of knowing whether a certain direction is promising;
2. a sense of solution, a feeling that a solution is pending, without knowing which, or knowing that there is a better solution than the present one;
3. knowledge that something about a solution is wrong or lacking;
4. the appearance of meaningful visual images, words, memories, or kinesthetic sensations;
5. the incubation phenomenon, the sudden appearance of a solution at an unexpected moment;
6. warnings, uncanny feelings, a foresight of danger that afterward proves justified;
7. one’s knowledge of what is good for oneself, inner knowing;
8. the first impression of a person’s trustworthiness;
9. gut feeling in decisions;
10. hunches in selection and memory tasks; and
11. artistic inspiration and creativity.

Some authors have attempted to overcome this diversity by proposing several other characteristics that intuitive phenomena have in common. Baylor (1997) identified immediacy, the sense of a relationship, and reason as shared elements in intuition. Bastick (1982) mentioned qualities such as a sense of correctness, immediacy, association with affect, global view, gestalt nature, preverbal character, fallibility, and influence of experience. Identifying these common factors is a preliminary step in moving from a descriptive to a causal level, but neither of these authors presented a functional model for integrating these common qualities. Arvidson (1997) showed how Bastick failed to account for the difference between a “feeling of direction” and more comprehensive insight experiences. Monsay (1997) identified a distinction between physical intuition, which is based on previous experience, and creative metaphysical intuition, which surpasses the current frame of reference. Jung (1936/1971) postulated intuition as one of the four universal and fundamental mental functions, the others being thinking, feeling, and sensation. He conceived intuition as a directive and creative function but, again, did not go beyond the descriptive level: “On intuition, actual reality counts only in so far as it seems to harbor possibilities which then become the supreme motivating force, regardless of the way things actually are in the present” (p. 554). In spite of this variety of phenomena described by the term *intuition*, Boucouvalas (1997) concluded that most authors seem to converge in defining intuition as “direct knowing that seeps into conscious awareness *without the conscious mediation* [italics added] of logic or rational process” (p. 7).

EXPLANATORY MODELS OF INTUITION

Some authors have presented models to explain the functioning of intuition. Several of these models center around the notion of tapping directly into some source of knowledge. This may be conceived as receiving knowledge from some higher source, such as divine inspiration, the collective unconscious, inborn knowledge, or even telepathy. This commonly can be found in more religion-oriented theories or in writings in the new-age tradition (Briggs & Mosher, 1994; Hanna, 1993). Slightly less mystical but still untraceable is the idea of intuition being based on the personal unconscious, as proposed by several psychoanalytical writers (Reik, 1948; S. Shapiro, 1995).

Any of these solutions has the obvious disadvantage that, apart from the problem of being unverifiable scientifically, it does not shed any light on issues such as when, how, and in what form intuition appears in consciousness. What is needed is a model that can describe the underlying formal

process that produces intuition phenomena. An alternative that can provide an explanation for the richness of form and modality found in intuition can be found in the cognitive functions of pattern recognition. Several authors have worked in this direction.

James (1890/1950), in his chapter on discrimination and comparison, hinted at the association between intuition and the process of assessing similarity or dissimilarity: “But no matter how many may be the steps by which such inferential discriminations are made, *they all end in a direct intuition of difference somewhere* [italics added]” (p. 497). Reik (1948) observed, “A frequent part of our capacity for unconscious or preconscious perception is the observation that something is lacking, the subterranean awareness that something is not there” (p. 141). Such an awareness logically only is possible if there is a pattern that predicts that this “something” should be there. Rosenblatt and Thickstun (1994), within a psychoanalytical framework, proposed that intuition can best be explained by (unconscious) pattern matching. Schooler and Melcher (1995) suggested that insight is based on pattern recognition. Schooler and Melcher also showed that insight in tasks that require innovation seems to follow a nonverbal path, as verbal activity interferes with achieving insight, whereas for ordinary tasks this interference does not occur. Root-Bernstein (1997) stated that, “in essence, intuition is the ability of sensing an underlying order in things, and thus is related to still another mental tool that is indispensable to the working scientist: the perception of patterns, both visual and verbal” (p. 116). Bohart (1999), in discussing the role of intuition in psychotherapy, stated that “we detect patterns and rhythms in interaction” (p. 298).

If intuition is based on pattern recognition functions, it can be deduced that intuition should come in two forms, the recognition of a known pattern, and the diversion from a common pattern. When something is a known pattern, one experiences a feeling of recognition. When some perception is different from what one expects, one’s attention is caught. If we look at the above examples, we can distinguish phenomena such as hunches or feelings of direction that may follow from identifying matches with known patterns. Uncanny feelings and the intuition that something is wrong or missing most probably represent a diversion from known patterns.

For an intuition to be useful, it has to be unraveled; its meaning has to be understood. Within this model of pattern recognition, that means that the elements that initially made up the pattern have to be identified. As intuitions come in different forms and different modalities, some intuitions contain more information than others. An intuition in the form of an image contains more clues to its meaning than just an uncanny feeling. A sense of direction regarding where to look for the solution to a mathematical problem contains more information than does a hunch. A therapist’s

sudden feeling of despair contains more information than does a sense that a certain issue should be inquired into more profoundly. The degree to which the elements that make up the pattern provide information about the structure of the pattern depends on the type of intuition. This means that the variety of intuition phenomena may be classified according to the amount of information they contain. It is thus more useful to speak not about a single intuition but about an *intuitive process* that consists of a sequence of phases, where, in each phase, the amount of information represented in the intuition increases.

PHASES OF INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE REPRESENTATION

The various phenomena that have been designated as intuition may be divided into five phases, each with a different mode of knowledge representation. They form a sequence in which the amount of information contained in the intuition increases from one phase to another. Thus, with every phase, the specificity and discriminative potency of the intuitive phenomenon increase.

1. Detection Phase

This phase involves a sign of something dawning in consciousness. One's attention is drawn to something; one has the feeling that something is happening or present. Often this phase is experienced as a feeling of confusion, alertness, or being disturbed or troubled. An example comes from Reik (1948): "Something in the remark worked upon me as a kind of warning signal" (p. 183). This is intuition in its most basic form; one feels that something is happening, without any clues as to the "why or what."

2. Dichotomic Awareness Phase

The next type of intuition occurs when some of the quality of the intuition comes into awareness. Most readers will recognize the quite remarkable experience of feeling that something is wrong or that a solution is at hand *before* they know what it is or what it is related to: The experience is pregestaltic. This experience of intuition may be compared with the experience of a lost thought; one knows it is lost and has no clue what it was or what one was thinking about.

A host of everyday linguistic expressions can be found that refer to this dichotomic quality. A negative quality may be expressed as “there is something missing,” “something smells bad,” “something odd is going on,” “it doesn’t feel right,” or “something is wrong.” A positive quality may be referred to as “a sense of solution,” “something important is happening,” or “things are falling into place.” Also, the positive quality may be experienced as a sense of beauty.

This type of intuition is often described in crime fiction. A nice example of a transition from the detection phase to dichotomic awareness can be found in Agatha Christie’s (1953) *Funerals are Fatal*. One of the characters, Helen, after repeatedly having remembered and feeling somewhat uneasy about the funeral, suddenly realizes, in all clearness, that something is wrong:

There was something wrong with that picture [memory]. Something . . . ? Somebody . . . ? Was it an expression on someone’s face? Was that it? Something that—how could she put it?—ought not to have been there . . . ? She didn’t know . . . she couldn’t place it . . . but there had been something—somewhere—*wrong*.
(p. 19)

3. Related Object Phase

In this phase, it becomes clear to what objects (observations, ideas, events) the intuition is related, but in most cases one still does not know what the intuition is in itself. One is now able to identify elements that one senses or knows to be relevant. These related objects give one a sense of where to look for solutions or meaning. An illustrative example, mentioned by Bohart (1998) during a workshop, is that someone can feel that something is wrong (dichotomic awareness) with his marriage (related object). However, he can’t tell *what* is wrong. Another example can be found in ordinary conversation with, for example, a friend, after which one may feel odd and be able to pinpoint certain remarks or subjects that seem to cause this feeling of oddness. It is remarkable that one can be quite sure about the relevance of these factors without knowing how they are related to one’s feeling.

After one knows one is close to the solution of a (mathematical) problem, one may be able to identify some concrete elements or ideas that are connected to an eventual solution, before one actually has an idea of the structure of the solution itself. Wertheimer (1945/1977) described Einstein’s thinking about the relativity of space and time: “He felt a gap somewhere without being able to clarify it, or even to formulate it” (p. 97; dichotomic awareness). Einstein then started to investigate the notion of simultaneity, as if he knew that this notion would provide information

about a solution for this problem. The physicist Feynman became fascinated by the wobbling movement of a soup plate spinning in the air but only much later discovered that it was analogous to other physical problems he was working on (Gribbin & Gribbin, 1998).

4. Metaphorical Solution Phase

Whereas, in the previous phase, one is able to identify some relevant elements, in this phase it becomes clear how these elements are important. The intuition presents itself in the form of images, words, or feelings, but authors reporting these intuitions seem to have a predominant modality. Reik (1948), for instance, reported primarily auditory intuitions, such as songs, words, melodies, poems, and conversations, whereas, for instance, Monsay (1997) reported primarily intuitions of a kinesthetic nature. However, the gestalt may also take the form of an emotional quality, such as anxiousness, sadness, sexual arousal, tenderness, or irritation. Finally, it may be more cognitive, such as a memory, fantasy, association, or distraction. The husband who feels something is wrong with his marriage may experience a sense of being trapped or have an association with a newspaper article on a man condemned to a life sentence. The mathematician may feel that there is a shortcut available for the problem he's working on. A businessman may get the feeling that he should not do something he was considering.

The knowledge about the intuition is increased in this phase in the sense that some of the solution itself is now revealed, but still in a veiled form. Though a gestalt is now perceivable, the explicit meaning of the gestalt in relation to the solution still has to be unraveled. Whatever the form or modality of the gestalt is, its meaning has to be decoded. Monsay (1997) illustrated the nonverbal character of this phase: "I usually perceive it as 'knowing,' or feeling or image before any words or equations can be employed" (p. 105). These images or associations that appear usually help, in an analogous way, to clarify the intuition. The mental images hint at the meaning in a metaphorical or "as if" form. The song that comes to mind may have relevant lyrics or point to a relevant state of mind. The therapist may worry, "The gesture made me feel waved away, unimportant, does the client take me seriously?" The mathematician may wonder how the torus image relates to his or her problem, being able to travel circularly in two different directions.

5. Explicit Verbal Understanding Phase

At this stage, the intuition is entirely understood. The meaning of the intuition is now completely clear. This meaning has become clear through

identification of the elements that made the proposed metaphor or concept fit. The husband understands that his feeling of being trapped in his marriage can be exemplified by many instances in which he inhibited his wishes and abstained from certain behaviors for fear of criticism by his wife. The mathematician discovers that the torus adequately models the intermixing circular movements present in the phenomenon he is working on and that the mathematical description of a torus has to be adapted to his problem.

I relate an experience that illustrates not only how I reached the phase of explicitly understanding an intuition but also the importance of verifying this understanding. (The phases of the model in this illustration and in the remainder of the article are indicated by Phase 1, Phase 2, etc.) One night I was out with friends in a restaurant, and we ordered a bottle of the house wine. Because we quite liked the wine, halfway through the meal we decided to order another bottle. When the waiter brought the bottle in a cooler, he quite elaborately apologized for bringing the wine already opened, attributing his “mistake” to automatism. This whole scene somehow struck me as odd (Phase 2). Why did he say that? That remark about having opened the bottle seemed strange to me (Phase 3). It was somehow superfluous and unnecessary (Phase 4). I tried to find an explanation. Probably it was a lack of knowledge of the etiquette on my part. I had never given it any thought, really, but, in fact, bottles are usually opened at the table. The correct procedure seems to be that first the bottle is shown to the drinker, who confirms his or her choice, then the bottle is uncorked, a little bit is served for tasting, and, after approval, the wine is served. It was probably good etiquette also to open a second bottle at the table. The waiter had seemed a bit nervous, so he must have been afraid of a reprimand and had therefore apologized excessively to correct his error (Phase 5). It was, in fact, a classy restaurant, so that also explained why, on other occasions, I had never noticed this etiquette. I was quite pleased with my explanation and convinced that the problem was my ignorance about etiquette, until I tasted the wine. It was much inferior to the first one we had drunk, and now I understood that my hypothesis had been wrong. The apology had indeed been overdone, and it was not to correct an error but to conceal the fact that the wine had been switched for an inferior one. My intuition had been correct, but my interpretation had failed.

The five-phase model I propose has the following implications.

1. Intuitive phenomena can be classified according to their knowledge representation. It permits ordering the variety of intuition phenomena while simultaneously demonstrating at what level the knowledge is represented in the different intuitive phenomena. I provide two examples that I found in the literature to illustrate this point. Reik (1948) described the following process:

As I was writing the dream-interpretation, I had the vague impression I was omitting [Phase 2] something in my thoughts or in the description of the situation that led to the production of the dream. I had forgotten something or skipped over something [Phase 2], but what was it? I knew where I had to search for it, but couldn't find it. It was somehow connected [Phase 3] with the reproach I had made to my wife: that she was responsible for the fact that I had to suffer so much from the heat. I knew that this reproach was to some extent unjust, but to what extent? I had the uncomfortable feeling that I was myself more responsible than she, but how [Phase 3]? I knew I ought to correct the mistake in the presentation here; I knew I had made a mistake [Phase 3], but I didn't know what to add or what to replace. . . . The reminder, which I could not brush aside, was itself irksome. A strange comparison came to mind: it was as if some man occupied with serious work is annoyed because a little boy, his son for instance, pulls him by the sleeve to call his attention to some insignificant thing [Phase 4]. . . . It was the understanding of just this "stupid" comparison which at last gave me the clue to what I had suppressed [Phase 5]. (p. 60)

The second example is from Monsay (1997), who wrote about a scientific discovery: "I suddenly knew I had the solution to our problem [Phase 2]. First came this 'knowing,' then an essentially kinesthetic feeling for what was involved [Phase 4], and finally, the words to describe the invention [Phase 5]" (p. 104).

Though the order in which these processes appear in consciousness seems rather fixed, there is at least one exception possible: The unfolding meaning phase may come before the related object phase. For example, a client may first feel trapped and lost in his or her life (Phase 4) and only later be able to identify that it has to do with his or her professional situation (Phase 3). When certain phases do not occur, it means not that representations belonging to previous phases are not present but rather that they are covered in one stretch. Take, for instance, a client who reports that coming to therapy reminds him of traveling as a child alone on a bus for the first time. The detection, dichotomic awareness, and related object phases are implicitly present. In the extreme case in which complete verbal understanding is reached immediately, in which the intuition is completely understood and its reasons and relevant instances are immediately available, the understanding ceases to be an intuition. It is experienced not as an intuition but simply as an idea or a thought.

2. The model opens the possibility of investigating intuition as a cognitive process. It describes phenomenologically how, in each phase, knowledge is represented in increasing levels of complexity. This also opens the possibility of describing these phases in terms of known and well-documented cognitive functions. The detection phase can be related to functions of arousal of attention. The dichotomic phase most likely mimics processes found in pattern recognition and discovery. In the related object phase, the intuition seems to be associated with concrete elements of episodic memory, whereas in the metaphorical solution phase, the intuition is related to more conceptual elements from semantic memory. Finally,

explicit verbal understanding may be investigated in terms of the cognitive function of reasoning.

3. The model demonstrates the creative character of intuition. Intuition is not a single phenomenon but rather a process of early stages of knowledge representation. It is instrumental (and may be essential) in the construction of knowledge itself. It thus shows that intuition is of a creative nature and allows the investigation of the creative process in various stages. When one considers these phases, one faces the issue of whether these stages should be viewed as a discovery or as a construction (for this discussion, see also Bohart, 1999). It may be argued that detecting a pattern match (or a lack of this match) and unraveling its meaning is not creative, because the pattern already existed. But this is not the whole argument. Any pattern to be detected has to exist mentally before it can be compared: Forming the mental representation of this pattern is a truly creative act.

4. The model demonstrates that intuition is a fallible process. Several authors have reported the sense of correctness and certainty that often accompanies the experience of intuition (Bastick, 1982; Monsay, 1997). Poincaré (1913, cited in Hadamard, 1945) said, for instance, "I felt a perfect certainty" (p. 13). Conceptualizing intuition as a process based on pattern matching makes clear that it is as fallible as any other cognitive process. False positives and negatives are liable to occur, and intuitions thus need to be verified. The person has to test with reason whether the concept implicit in the metaphorical solution phase is adequate to reality.

INTUITION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

Several authors writing about psychotherapy have touched on the subject of intuition, but relatively few have made it the center of their writings. The first to write extensively about intuition and to elaborate its usefulness for clinical purposes was Reik (1948). He clearly was an auditory person, because most of his intuitions came in auditory form, such as words, names, and songs. He also chose an auditory metaphor to describe intuition in the title of his book *Listening With the Third Ear* (p. 144). In the psychotherapeutic situation, therapists may have intuitions about diagnosis, possible interventions, personality, or socialization factors of a particular patient, recognizing similarities or detecting dissimilarities of a combination of features of other patients. Characteristic of intuition, however, is the fact that one is not aware of the individual elements in the situation that make up the pattern; one only senses the fitting or nonfitting gestalt. Reik (1948) elaborated a number of elements that usually go unaccounted for but make part of the therapist's unconscious perception of the patient:

peculiarities of features, movements, dress, gestures, tone of voice, olfactory nuance, sense of touch while shaking hands, warmth, clamminess, softness, smoothness, the way a person looks, glances and looks. Muscular twitching in the face while speaking, breath, choice of words, tone of voice, little stresses on certain words, loudness of voice, vocal modulations, rhythm, accent (and most important the combinations of these particularities), subliminal perception, our instinctual feeling or reaction toward a person (slight annoyance after the patient has left) feeling bound/hypnotized/lightly impressed, the remarkable pleasantness that a patient can transmit. (p. 135)

Reik then specified further, "There remains, to lead us in our search [for unconscious secrets], only what we call intuition, that is experience, which has become unconscious. Intuition serves us like a blind man's dog" (p. 273). In numerous examples, he demonstrated how he, as a therapist, used this instrument. Reik did not put intuition above the "proper" analytic technique but viewed it as essential for being an effective analyst and discovering or understanding things about the patient that otherwise would not be possible: "But only he who is entirely himself, only he who has the sharpest ear for what his own thoughts whisper to him, will be a good psychoanalyst" (p. 271). Most dynamically oriented authors have taken this stance toward intuition as a complement to rational procedures. S. Shapiro (1995), for instance, advocated "creative intuition alongside analytic discipline" (p. 7). Lomas (1993) saw intuition as a quality "that greatly enhances [therapists'] capacity" (p. 19) for psychotherapeutic work. More specifically, he indicated the usefulness of intuition for timing interventions, such as determining when the patient can and should take responsibility for his or her actions. Wachtel (2001), discussing the often overly rationalistic approach of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, remarked, "Knowledge often is advanced in important ways by attending to intuitively grasped coherences that are not yet accessible to operational definitions" (p. 88). Rosenblatt and Thickstun (1994) gave a slight primacy to intuition, noting that "it is our contention that the experienced 'expert' psychoanalyst, in developing understanding, relies more on intuitive pattern-matching from a vast storehouse of complex behavioral and rational patterns that reflect underlying dynamic constellations, than on theory-based procedural rules" (p. 712), but they warned, "On the other hand, intuition without subsequent checking within some framework is more likely to lead to 'wild' analysis" (p. 713).

Hellmuth Kaiser (1965) did not specifically refer to intuition but described an intuitive procedure that is closely related to the dichotomic detection phase. He referred to how, usually after talking to a patient for several sessions, a sense of oddness or strangeness invades the therapist about the way the patient is communicating, the feeling that somehow the patient is not talking "straight." He described how this sensation is followed by another phenomenon that can closely fit the metaphorical solu-

tion phase: the appearance of a new gestalt perception of the client (p. 50). Rogers (1986) clearly gave primacy to intuition:

As a therapist, I find that when I am closest to my inner, intuitive self, when I am somehow in touch with the unknown in me, when perhaps I am in a slightly altered state of consciousness in the relationship, then whatever I do seems full of healing. (p. 130)

For Gendlin (1981, 1996), the intuitive process is at the very heart of the therapeutic technique. The focusing technique aims at giving (explicit) meaning to the initially nonverbal, bodily felt sense. This parallels the process described above, but Gendlin did not distinguish formal phases; he was primarily interested in devising a technique for extracting meaning from experience. Many elements of his technique can easily be fitted into the knowledge representation model. For instance, the question of listing things that are keeping one from feeling absolutely content and the “felt sense” of these problems probes directly for the type of experience as found in the dichotomous awareness phase. The searching for a visual or auditory “handle” by which to describe the quality of this feeling narrowly fits the metaphorical solution phase (cf. Gendlin, 1981, pp. 43–64). For Bohart (1999), who also came from the experiential tradition, intuition is an essential instrument for effective psychotherapy. He wrote extensively about the role of intuition and the need for creativity in psychotherapy. He argued that “what I extract perceptually and intuitively from lived experience is far more compelling than thought information” (p. 294) and is therefore the preferred mode of functioning for the moment-to-moment process of psychotherapy. Finally, Caspar (1997), who researched the use of intuition and conscious analytic processes during clinical intake interviews, concluded that therapists perform better when they make use of both conscious–rational–analytic and intuitive processes.

Intuition has been my company for many years, and it has proven to be valuable in many ways. I consider the contribution of intuition to be in many cases complementary to theoretical and rational approaches, but on several occasions it has proved essential for arriving at decisive insights about my cases. To start with, I give an example that illustrates how intuitions appear and can be developed during a psychotherapy session. I was seeing a client who was unable to refuse any request; she was always helping people but felt resentful that people didn’t see what she needed. She systematically countered any intervention for change with the argument that she was “like that,” smiling, somehow satisfied, revealing a subtle pride in her behavior. During one of these “battles,” the image of sharing food came spontaneously into my mind. After some thought, I understood it could be used as a metaphor for the client’s behavior. I then asked her to imagine a “cake of happiness” and how she would divide it between herself and another person. She said she would first give away what the

other person needed and then eat what was left. I then suggested that she thought she was only good enough for the leftovers (provoking her). She responded that if others were like her, things would be distributed more fairly. When she said this, I felt confused by her argument, and moments after that I knew that something was wrong with this argument. Next, I realized that my feeling confused had to do with something the client had said earlier. Finally, I remembered what she told me and understood immediately that there really was a contradiction: She had offered to help a friend financially but had hidden from her friend how badly she needed the money herself, because she thought that if he had known she was short of money herself he would not have accepted, because he was “just like” her. I confronted her with this contradiction. Only later did I understand the importance of this intervention in helping to reveal the client’s active participation in maintaining “unfair” situations.

In this example, one can see various important aspects. First, there are two instances of intuition, each of a different level of knowledge representation. The first is the image of sharing food, which is of the unfolding meaning level. The second is the confusion about the client’s argumentation, which starts off at the detection level. It can also be recognized that both intuitions have to be decoded to be useful. The metaphor of food has to be understood as useful in describing the client’s functioning. In this example, the understanding was relatively quick, but sometimes it can be laborious, taking several days. I usually do not share these intuitions with patients until I understand their meaning, because I want to be able to foresee the impact they may have and I want some proof of their correctness. In the second occurrence of intuition, all the phases from the model can be identified: the feeling of confusion (detection), knowing something was wrong with the client’s argument (dichotomic awareness), realizing that it had to do with something she said earlier in the session (related object), and, finally, an explicit understanding of a contradiction through remembering what the client said. Obviously, this example is a nice one, and in other instances not so many phases may be present or so clearly identifiable.

For some psychotherapists who do not commonly make use of intuitive resources, it may be difficult to understand what experiences to look for. Intuition takes place in an intimate world, so subtle that we hardly ever take notice of its existence. Even more rarely is it communicated, and almost never is a description of it attempted. It is a factory of pieces of thoughts, images, and vague feelings, where the raw materials seem to float around half formless, a world so often present, though we hardly ever visit it. However, some of these floating elements come to stand out, gain strength, or show up repeatedly. When exemplified, they may be easier to recognize and cross the border of consciousness. For this reason, I present

a selection of examples relevant to the psychotherapeutic situation. Many of these examples stem from my psychotherapeutic practice; others are taken from the literature. Some of the examples may partially overlap other examples.

Examples of Intuition in the Detection Phase

Lingering Feelings

It may take several sessions before one acknowledges a feeling that, once recognized, one remembers to have been faintly present for weeks but that one didn't fully attend to and that slipped away again.

Feeling Confused

Sometimes during a session, the client's attitude or narrative leaves the therapist confused. This may be the first sign of something important that is going on.

Sense of Importance

This involves a sense that something is important or that something is happening. The therapist cannot yet say why and sometimes not even what, but somehow he or she is alerted. It is a sign for the therapist to stay with the subject or not to interfere with the patient's discourse.

Examples of Intuition in the Dichotomic Awareness Phase

Feeling of Contradiction

In this example, one can feel that something is not right in someone's reasoning or justification. This is, as Bohart (1999) put it, "the sense that there is something wrong in the flow of an argument" (p. 295). Only after some pondering can one understand where the flaw or fallacy resides.

Global Feeling of the Case

I try to keep in close touch with my general felt sense of the case. I “know” when a case is on track or when something feels “off.” I may have a feeling that I don’t like the way things are going—that something is not going well or is going too well. This category encompasses any uncanny feeling the therapist may have about a case. This feeling is the marker for thinking seriously about a case or bringing it to supervision.

Feeling of Incompleteness

The client is talking about a subject, but it feels as if something is left out. The whole of the situation doesn’t make sense. Something appears to be missing. Kaiser (1965) referred to something very similar, saying that he sometimes got the feeling that the client was not “talking straight” (p. 162).

Change in the Process

This involves the feeling that something has changed either during the session or from one session to another. Bohart (1999) gave an example of something that had changed for the worst: “the sense that something is wrong because we can pick up the subtle change in rhythm” (p. 295). One may also feel that something has changed for the better, or the patient could be relating to therapist in a different way, which might represent growth or therapeutic progress.

Sensation of Oddness

This includes uncalled for justifications, unexpected acts, unexpected emotions, odd phrasing, and the use of an unexpected verbal tense. One of my clients, when talking about a friendship, said, “We were building a life together.” The use of the word *life* was odd, as it fits more in the context of a marriage than a friendship. Another client said, “Even my mother noticed I was not feeling well.” Other examples of this kind can be found in the work of D. Shapiro (1965, 1989).

Examples of Intuition in the Related Object Phase

Standing Out

This occurs when, during a session, among many words, movements, phrases, and thoughts, suddenly one stands out. The therapist may feel that a client's hand movement is pregnant or full of meaning. Things alert me often in therapy without my having a clue about why, but, as a rule, I inquire of the patient at this point to see where it leads. The therapist may, for instance, feel that a certain gesture or facial expression is very typical or meaningful in a particular patient. At other times, the therapist may be fascinated by some tiny detail of a patient's story. A client mentioned that she liked painting, and somehow I felt that this stood out; this proved, in fact, to be a clue to a central aspect of her problem. She was a very sensitive and creative person, always dreaming and creating things. She had never understood her true nature, had the wrong profession, and continuously blamed herself for being distracted, dreamy, and unpractical.

Incongruence

Incongruence occurs when one detects a discrepancy between the client's claims about himself or herself and his or her acts or when verbal and nonverbal communication are at odds. Rogers (1951) referred to this as *incongruence*. Kaiser (1965) called this aspect duplicity, giving the example of a patient who claims he desires something but fails to undertake the proper or expected action to attain his goal. At other times, the patient may simply not be convincing, trying to be something he or she is not (D. Shapiro, 1965, 1989).

Examples of Intuition in the Metaphorical Solution Phase

"Knowing" Facts About a Client's Life

Reik (1948) stated, "We know things about a person and have no inkling of how we know them" (p. 272). He gave examples of how he guessed that a client had had a miscarriage when she noted a book standing upside down in his bookshelf.

Physical Sensations

The therapist may feel physical pain or stress during a session that either is also felt by the patient or is symbolic of the patient's feeling state. Examples are a tendency to cry, pain in the stomach, tense shoulders, and difficulty in breathing.

Images

While talking with a client, I may think of a city. The spontaneous images of Botticelli's Venus led me to discuss romantic issues with a patient; images of a building in Amsterdam may draw attention to more unconventional aspects of a patient. These images serve as a hint, and I may direct the conversation to art, to rebelliousness, or to related topics to see what happens. It seems that the more unexpected or unconnected they are, the more meaning they eventually reveal. An example of such an image is a vision of a client lying on the ground or bent over, like Van Gogh's "Sorrow."

Words

Words, poems, or lyrics may come up spontaneously, containing information about the ongoing therapeutic process. Reik (1948) gave an example of a children's rhyme that helped him to understand countertransference feelings. S. Shapiro (1995) recounted that a patient told him about an interpersonal encounter in which the other person had backed off from an interaction that the patient had thought playful: The analyst thought of the expression "playing it too rough." When he shared this with the patient, childhood memories of playing it too rough came up. The therapist then recognized the same pattern in the countertransference, because he himself had also felt that the patient played it too rough. Shapiro was then able to find various "supportive data" (p. 709) in the analysis of the client.

Melodies

Sometimes a melody comes up of which the lyrics bear relevance to the process at work. A song by REM that spontaneously came up during a session contained the lyrics "readying to bury your father and your

mother” and made me realize that I had talked with my patient about his mother but never about his father.

Distractions

Not seldom, a therapist may be thinking of something seemingly unrelated that turns out to be symbolically related to what the client is talking about or sheds light on the interpersonal process of that moment. Examples are something that happened to the therapist, a program he or she saw on TV, or a recent news topic or political development. Bohart (1999) called this “thoughts that come unbidden” (p. 304).

Fantasies

I sometimes have fantasies of doing certain things with my clients, such as walking, eating, or hugging. These often imply that I have detected some kind of need of the patient. For example, I once fantasized dancing with a client, which proved to be a clue for the client wanting to be led and oriented.

Comparisons

One client may remind me of another, of important persons in my life, or of a famous person. During one process, the idea forced itself on me during many sessions that the client physically resembled a famous rock star. This set me on the trace of narcissistic elements in his character and, later, even similarities with the life events of this particular rock star. Only after I recognized its importance did this idea became less intrusive.

Impressions

Intuitive impressions can involve experiencing the client during a particular session as childlike, old, beautiful, strong, vulnerable, badly dressed, or sexy. It once struck me during a session that a little spot under a patient’s eye resembled a tear; only later did I understand that her overall mood that day was extremely sad.

Emotions

This involves the sudden appearance of a poignant feeling of sadness, anxiousness, or pride or the feeling of being pressured, seduced, or flattered. The therapist who feels anxious may come to understand that his or her feeling is not only his or her own security but also a reflection of the patient's insecurity about something.

Action Tendencies

Sometimes it is the action tendency rather than the feeling component of the emotion (Greenberg & Safran, 1987) that is present in the intuition. One may want to retaliate, cancel a session, or call a client in between sessions. S. Shapiro (1995) described such an instance: "My intuition came to my rescue. I suddenly had a strong image of myself sitting next to her on the couch. Without thinking, I got up and went to her, sat next to her, and put my arm around her" (p. 144).

Stereotypes

A client sometimes may strike one as a stereotyped figure, which metaphorically informs one about his or her character: a porcelain doll, a Greek philosopher, a soldier, a Cinderella, or a farmer. Sometimes meaningful nicknames spontaneously turn up when one is discussing cases in team meetings. Omer (1994) often used fairy tale figures or other stereotypes in his story letters to open a therapeutic process that was stuck.

Warning

At other times, I suddenly remember a client before going to sleep or while driving. For example, one night I suddenly thought about a session I had had during that day, and I had a warning feeling. I felt that I had to be careful with the patient's smile. I'd seen that before. She smiled as if she did not take what I said seriously. Yes, there was definitely something disqualifying about her smile, as if it said, "Yeah this is all very nice what we are talking about, but it won't work." I thought to myself, "Yeah, I have to inquire about her smile."

In the above-mentioned examples, intuition functions as a guideline, a warning, or a clue that occurs during the process. The value lies in enhanc-

ing the efficiency of the therapeutic process, as the therapist might have arrived at the same conclusion through ordinary processes.

In other situations in which creativity is required, intuition may turn out to be of key importance. Safran and Segal (1990; Safran & Muran, 2000) described these situations as therapeutic impasses. This is the moment when the therapist feels completely stuck and lost in a case. Safran explained this phenomenon as the therapist being strung in the (dysfunctional) interpersonal cycle of the patient. The reason that intuition is essential in this phase is that there is no rational way out, because the known theoretical models fail to describe the patient's functioning. The process at that point is dealing with such a specific and idiosyncratic way of functioning that it eludes theory. There is no other way out than a truly creative process; the therapist must try to understand the unique aspects of the client's personality and functioning.

Safran and Muran (2000) mentioned several intuitive phenomena (e.g., feelings, fantasies) that can be helpful in the resolution of the impasse. Though often difficult and painful, there is something very beautiful about this moment in the sense that it is the starting point for a true encounter between the therapist and the patient (see Buber, 1923/1958). It is a very intimate moment in which the therapist meets the patient in his or her individuality and gets to know aspects that are truly unique for this patient. It is somehow comforting to know that, to a certain point, we can't fit a human being completely into our theoretical models. This means that there is a moment of original encounter when we have to leave all theory behind to meet and understand the person in front of us.

INTUITION AND TECHNIQUE

Because the occurrence of intuition is largely spontaneous, it is rather difficult to devise a technique for promoting intuition. Intuitions usually represent experiences that are somehow on the fringe of or parallel to conscious and willful activity. As Nietzsche (1895/1954) put it so nicely in *Also sprach Zarathustra* [Thus Spoke Zarathustra], there are "thoughts that come on dove's feet" (p. 145). The book's previous chapter was intended to alert the reader to the possible forms and modalities of intuitive phenomena in psychotherapy so that they may be more easily recognized. But is there anything else that can be done to promote intuition?

Intuition is certainly influenced by the will, in the sense that it depends on the therapist's willingness and effort to acknowledge whether he or she notices intuitive phenomena. However, the frequency with which intuitions

occur also seems related to a person's motivation and interest. One does not have intuitions randomly but about things one is interested in, things relevant to one's life. It is my experience that interrogating oneself consciously about issues concerning the therapeutic process stimulates the occurrence of intuitions relevant for these questions.

I have found several questions to be particularly useful in this respect. The first question came from reading Kaiser's (1955, 1962, 1965) work on psychotherapy. He argued that psychopathology is marked by something odd in the client's communication. He suggested that the therapist ask himself or herself, "How is this client not being straight with me?" An equally useful question that David Shapiro suggested to me in a letter (July 1994) is "What is this client trying to do with me?" A question that is central to Safran and Segal (1990; Safran & Muran, 2000) work is, "How do I feel at this moment in the interaction with this client?" A question that I derived from the work of Yalom (1989, 1997) is, "How am I not being completely honest with this client?" When I have felt lost with a client, one of these four questions has invariably helped me develop intuitions of what was going on in the therapeutic process.

Another technique that has been mentioned by various authors as a key to the detection of intuitive phenomena lies in modifying the attentional stance. In the authors' experience, detection can be stimulated through attention to those experiences that are slightly off center of one's conscious mental activity. It may thus be helpful not to be too focused on the therapeutic task. Freud (1912) probably had something similar in mind when he advocated that analysis should be done with "evenly hovering attention": "It . . . consists in making no effort to concentrate the attention on anything in particular, and maintaining in regard to all that one hears the same measure of calm, quiet attentiveness" (p. 111). Safran and Muran (2000) referred to this attentional stance as mindfulness, a concept stemming from the Buddhist tradition, which they defined as "directing one's attention in order to become aware of one's thoughts, feelings, fantasies, or actions as they take place in the present moment" (p. 57).

In exemplifying the model for the case of psychotherapy, this section has focused mainly on intuition as a phenomenon occurring with the psychotherapist while he or she is doing his or her work. Obviously there is also the intuition at work with the patient. I have mentioned, for instance, Gendlin's (1981) focusing technique, which helps to detect intuitive experiences in the patient. The therapist can apply the model to this technique to accompany more systematically the meaning-making process that takes place within the client, prompting for knowledge representations as yet absent in the patient's experience.

I give a verbatim excerpt from a therapy session to illustrate this point. The client was a young homosexual man who had been stuck in a highly

unsatisfying relationship with a man of his age for over a year. His partner had always refused sexual contact and had even refused physical contact for almost a year. Though there was not even a formal commitment from the other party, the client kept seeing the man almost daily, fantasizing about better times to come, and, in spite of some “efforts” to leave him, was not able to end the relationship. The client insisted that the man loved him but was not able to show it because he hadn’t accepted his homosexuality yet.

Somewhat out of the blue, the client remarked that the last time he went out with his boyfriend and another friend, something was “wrong” and that he felt “bad.” I decided to follow this lead because of the emotional intensity I sensed in the client’s words.

Therapist (T): You felt bad in what way? [I prompted to see whether the client could move directly to the fourth level of metaphoric representation.]

Client (C): Somehow lost, disoriented [The client seemed to be searching, but the answer was not convincing, and he was still stuck at the second level.]

T: Was there anything in the situation that was causing this feeling? [prompt for the related object]

C: He [boyfriend] didn’t look at me. [quick and sure answer]

T: What did that cause in you? I got the impression that feeling lost or disoriented did not completely describe your experience. Is there any better word you can think of? [prompt for emotional representation]

The client came up with *worthless*, *useless*, and *superfluous*. While the client was struggling, I noticed a parallel with his account of being neglected by his parents, who he felt didn’t see him, which helped me to suggest a word.

T: Would *unnoticed* fit?

C: Yeah! [big smile of recognition]

T: You know, Fred, this reminds me of what you told me of your parents, who didn’t take much notice of you.

The client started crying like a child, saying, in what seemed a mix of anger and despair, “But they loved me.”

T: So why didn’t they look at you, Fred? Wouldn’t you look at someone you love?

A period followed in which the client continued crying.

T: Maybe now can see that they loved you, but as a child it would be hard to come to any other conclusion than that they did not love you.

A final remark about the importance of intuition for psychotherapy integration is similar to the one made by Martin (1997). Apart from its common factor status, intuition may play an important role in integrative

clinical decision making. Intuition is, apparently, the process the mind uses to deal with new and complex information. Integrative therapists are faced with a plethora of factors, such as research outcomes, client characteristics, problem features, therapist attributes, the ongoing therapeutic process, and all these factors in the face of different theoretical frameworks and their particular conceptualizations, which have to be taken into consideration for clinical decision making. For this moment, I sidestep the inherent suggestion from the previous phrase that, for nonintegrative therapists working from a single theoretical base, clinical decision making is a clear-cut and obvious process. It is certainly, for the integrative psychotherapist, a major concern. Intuition may be the methodology that, in practice, most integrative therapists use to select from the eclectic base of available analysis options and decide what approaches or interventions to use on a moment-by-moment basis. The present model of the intuitive process may contribute to teaching and evaluating this intuitive integrative decision making.

CONCLUSION

The presented model conceives intuition as a common cognitive process of early knowledge representations based on pattern recognition. Intuition may be a window to the genesis of knowledge. The model thus presents an alternative for more mystical interpretations of intuition and counters intuition's often-acclaimed infallible nature. Intuition provides a valuable complementary instrument for the psychotherapist and other professionals to go beyond theory-driven activity. The distinction of the various phases may help to clarify the knowledge representation found in different types of intuition and thus provides clues to more systematically unraveling intuition's meaning. The model brings intuition back into the realm of science and opens the possibility for serious research on its workings and how it can be improved.

Several questions still remain to be answered. First, there seems to exist an inner compass that accompanies the decoding process of intuition and that needs further investigation. While one is looking for the correct interpretation or wording for an intuition, one has a feeling indicating the correctness of the proposed meanings or directions. Gendlin (1981), for instance, described how finding the right, fitting verbal expression is accompanied by a feeling of relaxation. This phenomenon is reminiscent of the notion of "feeling of knowing": a measure for the certainty one has about the correctness of one's knowledge (Hart, 1965; Koriat, 1993). It may also be related to the somatic marker hypothesis of Damásio (1994), which gives a sense of appropriateness or relevancy to people's experience.

Second, the relationship between intuition and creativity has to be clarified, as not all intuition seems to be creative. Creativity as a hallmark for intuition has been argued by many authors (Bastick, 1982; Bowers, Farvolden, & Mermigis, 1995; Hayes, 1989; Koestler, 1964). However, Bohart (1999), for instance, incorporated mechanistically performed acts into the concept of intuition. From the perspective of intuition as an act without conscious mediation, these acts certainly classify. Bohart argued that these acts imply creativity. For instance, driving a car, which can be done for long periods without conscious attention, implies a creative process, because “no new situation is exactly identical to a former situation” (p. 291). It has to be recognized that a model of mechanistically applying concepts may not be adequate and that there is a certain flexibility and even recreation involved even in the simplest behaviors (see, e.g., Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992). However, I prefer not to label situations such as car driving and dish washing as creative to avoid erosion of the concept.

A case may be made that there exists a second kind of intuition, which is less creative. A worthwhile contribution in this respect has come from Monsay (1997), who distinguished physical from metaphysical intuition. Physical intuition is the experience-based gut feeling that helps the scientist to solve problems within an established paradigm (see also Kuhn, 1970). Metaphysical intuition is true creativity that appears when there is a need to go beyond the paradigm, especially when elements from outside areas are important for a solution. Caspar (1997) found a similar distinction; when observing psychotherapists conducting clinical interviews, he found three factors: analytic processing, intuition, and automatization.

Both modes of functioning may be part of a single cyclical process of knowledge construction and implementation. After the phases of early knowledge representation of a creative process have been completed, the knowledge has come to maturity in a verbal explicit representation. After this phase, still another mastery phase may be hypothesized in which, for efficiency reasons, the process becomes automated and the individual acts without conscious contemplation. In this phase, the experienced professional, such as a psychotherapist or, in Bohart’s (1999) example, the surgeon who operates best “without thinking,” may impress by his or her fluent and seemingly effortless resolution of complex problems. Czikszenmilhalyi’s (1990) concept of “flow,” which is associated with efficient action from which metacognitions are absent, seems to describe quite precisely this mode of functioning. The moment that the normal pattern of automatic functioning is sensed as not fitting any more signals is the beginning of a new cycle in a creative process.

Monsay’s (1997) use of *physical* and *metaphysical* intuition, though intended to indicate exactly this distinction, is in itself not very clarifying. It may be that *creative intuition* versus *applied intuition* is better.

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